نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 گروه مطالعات خانواده و روانشناسی، دانشکده حضرت نرجس (س)، دانشگاه ولیعصر (عج) رفسنجان، رفسنجان، ایران
2 گروه آموزش، اقتصاد منابع طبیعی و محیط زیست، پژوهشکده علوم محیطی، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران.
3 معاونت سازمان شهرداریها و دهیاریهای کشور، تهران، ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
Introduction: Water resources in Iran have become one of the most central issues of sustainable development and environmental governance in recent decades. The intensification of water scarcity, inter-sectoral conflicts, the degradation of ecological capital, and the emergence of social conflicts over water allocation and use indicate that analyzing this issue solely through technical and engineering approaches is insufficient and requires attention to the institutional, social, and discursive dimensions of public policy-making. In this context, Garrett Hardin's theory of the "Tragedy of the Commons" remains one of the most frequently cited theoretical frameworks for explaining the exploitation of common-pool resources. However, its critical and institutional-sociological reinterpretation has received less attention. This study aims to provide an institutional reinterpretation of this theory and seeks to answer the following question: which of Hardin's theoretical propositions (state-centrism, pessimism toward collective action, the necessity of external control) are reproduced in Iran's Seventh Development Plan, and what are the implications of this reproduction for inequality in access to water resources? Hardin, emphasizing the conflict between individual rationality and collective interests, argues that commonly owned resources, in the absence of external control, are prone to overexploitation and degradation. He therefore proposes state intervention, strict regulation, or privatization of resources as solutions. However, critical and institutional reinterpretations of this theory have demonstrated that the way it is interpreted and operationalized in policy-making plays a decisive role in shaping resource governance patterns.
Material and methods: The research method is qualitative and based on directed thematic analysis. In this approach, although the coding process is conducted in an open and inductive manner, the categorization of themes is guided by the theoretical framework of the study (the main propositions of Hardin's theory). This method is more appropriate than pure inductive thematic analysis for analyzing legal documents, which have a prescriptive and non-discursive genre, because it allows for assessing the "reproduction or non-reproduction" of theoretical concepts in the legal text. The research population includes Articles 37 to 41 of the water sector of the Seventh Development Plan, and the data were extracted through open coding and systematic organization of themes.
Results and discussion: The descriptive findings indicated that the text of the program emphasizes four mechanisms: the dominance of state-centric logic, the commodification of water, securitized-political governance, and the institutionalization of control and criminalization. In interpreting these findings from the perspective of an institutional re-reading of Hardin's theory, it should be argued that the first mechanism (state-centrism) is a direct reproduction of Hardin's proposition regarding the "necessity of external control." The second mechanism (commodification) aligns with Hardin's assumption about the "individualistic rationality of users." The third and fourth mechanisms (control, surveillance, and criminalization) reflect Hardin's pessimism toward the capacity of local collective action. In contrast, none of these mechanisms rely on local institutions or monitored oversight by users themselves (as Ostromian alternatives). From this perspective, the Seventh Development Plan has not led to an escape from the "tragedy," but rather to the institutionalization of a securitized version of it.
Conclusion: The present study showed that the Seventh Development Plan reproduces four of the five propositions of Hardin's theory: (1) pessimism toward local collective action (absence of reference to local institutions), (2) the necessity of centralized state control, (3) state-centrism as the main solution, and (4) behavioral regulation through economic and punitive instruments. Only the proposition of "privatization" appears to a limited extent. The institutional structure of the plan strengthens the interests of powerful state groups and marginalizes small-scale farmers and local communities. This unbalanced representation, through the centralization of decision-making and the elimination of participatory mechanisms, reproduces inequality in access to water. Based on a critical re-reading of Hardin, three proposals are offered: (a) delegation of water allocation to basin councils, (b) design of participatory monitoring systems (the principle of "monitored oversight" by Ostrom), and (c) provision of conflict resolution mechanisms for equal access by disadvantaged groups. The limitation of the study is its exclusive focus on Articles 37-41 of the plan and the absence of analysis of hidden layers (e.g., meeting minutes, expert reports). Future research could open new horizons for institutional rethinking in Iran through critical discourse analysis or comparative studies with water-scarce countries.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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